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Abstract 
A much repeated strand of analysis in the banking crisis has been the issue of financial 
engineering gone wrong. Problems are attributed to innovative financial products so complex 
that risk and even ownership became untrackable. Characterising the financial products and 
transactions that led to the crisis primarily as financial engineering, however, tends to gloss over 
the other innovative skills and creative participants involved in their construction. This paper 
demonstrates that the significant practices behind the banking crisis involved not just financial 
engineering but legal engineering, legal engineering designed to systematically thwart regulation 
and bypass regulatory control. The paper, first, analyses the role of legal engineering in the 
banking crisis, showing it to have been a conscious strategy in which regulatory circumvention, 
complexity and opacity were integral parts. It then sets out some specific implications for future 
practice in business, government, regulation and the professions, and argues the need not just for 
new law and regulation, but more fundamentally for a new respect for the rule of law, for a new 
legal integrity, in both business and the professions.  
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One strand of analysis in the banking crisis has been the issue of financial engineering gone 
wrong. Problems are attributed to innovative financial products that were too readily believed to 
disperse risk2, backed by mathematical models3 that senior banking executives took at face 
value, without, it’s said, questioning or even comprehending them.4 The financial structures set 
in place were so complex that risk5 and even ownership became untrackable.6 People were 
blinded by ‘disaster myopia’7 and indeed market ideology.8  There was a dominant belief in the 
rationality of the market and a collective failure to recognise the limits of market, maths and risk 
management. Regulators are portrayed as carried along on this tide of false confidence, 
regulating through only a light touch with the focus on internal and market controls, and 
encouraged, or instructed,9 by politicians to do so. People questioning the reality of the 
emperor’s new clothes were dismissed as the ones who did not understand, lacking the 
sophistication to handle the magic of financial engineering. The subsequent crisis has revealed 
that the emperor was indeed unclothed, and the demand is for tougher regulation to stop this 
situation recurring, though with concerns, even in the throes of crisis, that regulation should not 
be so heavy handed as to stifle the lifeblood of financial innovation.10 
 
Characterising the financial products and transactions that led to the crisis primarily as financial 
engineering, however, tends to gloss over the other innovative skills and creative participants 
involved in their construction. A crucial component of the new banking products was legal 
creativity. The legal work behind such practices as securitisation was not confined to drafting the 
contracts to sell on risk. It was also about creatively removing the ‘obstacles’ of prudential 
regulation, accounting requirements and other legal and regulatory constraints intended to 
control or disclose risk.  Indeed circumventing capital adequacy regulation was a crucial driver 
behind much structured finance.  
 
This paper seeks to reconceptualise the significant practices behind the banking crisis as not just 
a matter of financial engineering but a matter of legal engineering, legal engineering that is 
common practice in all sophisticated business. It seeks to set the financial crisis in the context of 
                                                
2 Adair Turner, chairman FSA, ‘The financial crisis and the future of financial regulation’, The Economist’s 
Inaugural City Lecture, 21 January 2009  
3 Jill Teanor, ‘Toxic shock: how the banking industry created a global crisis’, Guardian, 8 April 2008   
4 Bridget Hutter, and Nigel Dodd, ‘Social Systems Failure? Trust and the credit crunch’ (December 2008) Risk and 
Regulation 4; Roman Tomasic, ‘Beyond “light touch” regulation of British Banks’, Conference on the Future of 
Financial Regulation, Glasgow University, 29-30 March 2009. 
5 ‘Product complexity has introduced increased opacity into our financial system, making it it almost impossible to 
determine where risk lies and making it much more difficult to achieve financial stability’ John McFall, chairman, 
House of Commons Treasury Committee, quoted by Alan McDermid, ‘Banks “refused to believe the good times 
were about to end”’, The Herald, 3 March 2008 
6 Stephen Schwarcz, ‘Protecting financial markets: lessons from the subprime mortgage meltdown’, Duke Law 
School Legal Studies Research Paper no 175, March 2008. Failure was exacerbated because ownership could not be 
tracked in order to restructure.  
7 See for example, John Plender, ‘Analysis: Error laden machine’ Financial Times, 3 March 2009  
8 Robert Peston, Today, Radio 4, 18 March 2009 
9 Adair Turner, chairman FSA, was reported as saying the FSA was put under pressure by Gordon Brown not to be 
‘heavy and intrusive’, to make regulation ‘more light touch’, Daily Telegraph, 26 February 2009 
10 IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, 2007, p126. E Englelen, I Erturk, J Froud, A Leaver, K Williams, 
‘Reconceptualising Financial Innovation’, Conference on the Future of Financial Regulation, Glasgow University, 
29-30 March 2009. 
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the wider practice of creative transaction structuring in which the driving characteristic is to 
deliberately and systematically thwart regulation and bypass regulatory control. The analysis is 
based on11 documentary analysis and on interviews over a long period of years at major 
companies, banks, accountancy and law firms, in the context of a wide range of regulatory, tax 
and accounting issues, although the interviews quoted from here relate specifically to banking. 
These were conducted before the banking crisis and give some insight into the legal practice and 
culture that I would argue contributed to it. The focus is sociological rather than legal. It explores 
the practice of legal engineering, and the attitude to law and compliance at its core. It is therefore 
concerned less with banking regulations than with how banks and their lawyers have reacted to 
them, and it is less about the financial instruments created than about the motivations behind 
them, depicting them as part of a pervasive strategic response to regulation, which itself needs to 
be critically reviewed. 
 
Reconceptualising the issue as one of creative legal circumvention rather than simply financial 
innovation suggests a different set of issues that need to be addressed in the wake of the financial 
crisis. This paper, first, analyses the role of legal engineering in the banking crisis, showing it to 
be a conscious strategy, in which regulatory circumvention, complexity and opacity were integral 
parts. It then sets out some specific implications for future practice in business, government, 
regulation and the professions, and argues the need not just for new law and regulation, but more 
fundamentally for a new respect for the rule of law, for a new legal integrity.  
 
 
Legal Engineering, intent and complexity 
 
A prime excuse for the financial crisis has been that those involved simply did not understand the 
complex financial instruments in use or realise the risk, organisational and systemic, they were 
creating. It is hard not to see this incomprehension as, in the kindest interpretation, a willing 
suspension of disbelief. Like the courtiers in the tale of the emperor’s new clothes, a lot of 
people were doing rather nicely out of this apparently misunderstood scenario. Indeed it might be 
fairly argued that if senior banking executives, taking vast rewards for the stewardship of their 
businesses, did not understand the products at their core, they ought to have, and a failure to 
probe was itself, to the layman if not the lawyer, a failure of duty.  
 
What is clear, however, is that the image of financial disaster as the result of ignorance or of 
unintended consequences simply does not wash when we view the innovative financial 
instruments through the lens of legal rather than just financial creativity.  The legal creativity 
involved was knowingly and deliberately aimed at avoiding laws and regulations put in place to 
                                                
11 This research was carried out over a period of some 25 years, in a series of projects on business regulation, in 
particular in the areas of corporate finance, creative accounting (especially off-balance sheet financing in both 
corporate and banking sectors) and tax avoidance, and covering issues in the UK, the European Union and the US. 
The projects all involved in-depth interviews with a wide range of big firm lawyers and accountants, bankers, 
corporate executives, in-house counsel and regulators. See, for examples of the work, D McBarnet Crime, 
compliance and control (Aldershot, Ashgate Dartmouth, 2004). One key issue to emerge from that research was the 
routine practice of ‘creative compliance’and it was the role of  creative legal work in accomplishing that which 
became one of the key issues researched under the ESRC professorial fellowship (RES-051-0031). The broad 
analysis in this paper is therefore based on a whole range of research projects over many years while the interviews 
quoted took place as part of research conducted in 2004 and 2006-07.  
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control risk and to ensure its disclosure. Of course regulators  may have been lax and regulations 
insufficiently demanding, too permissive, perhaps naïve. But the fact of the matter is that 
however the regulations had been formulated they would have met with the same response: here 
is a constraint; how do we gain a competitive advantage by getting round it? 
 
Finding arguably legal ways round legal and regulatory obstacles is a key function of the 
lawyer’s role for sophisticated clients such as banks, and sophisticated legal circumvention has 
been integral to the construction of innovative financial products in banking. As one banking 
lawyer put it in interview: 
 
The traders talk to people in the marketplace. “What problems do you have at the moment, 
what would you really need if you could have something devised for you?” Then they look at 
pricing models, and mathematical models, and then the next stage is the law. This could be 
very good, very lucrative, what legal hurdles are there?12 
 
Or again: 
 
The credit group at [X] Bank is a specialist structured group in the capital markets which 
focuses on credit instruments to securitise and it’s a wonderfully lucrative business, but there 
are lots of laws, regulations and concepts and natural justice principles which, you know, 
inconveniently get in the way and they have to be reformed or modified or creatively dealt 
with.13 
 
These quotations articulate particularly clearly a culture and approach to law which is not always 
so baldly verbalised but which is clearly and consistently demonstrated in the practice of legal 
work described to me over many years in corporate and professional interviews. Regulation is an 
obstacle to be overcome. In the particular context of banking, laws and regulations that obstruct 
financial engineering have to be removed by legal engineering:  ‘If law is inconvenient to the 
economic features of the proposal the lawyer must get round it.’14 
 
The banking crisis in context 
 
Legal engineering lies at the heart of the banking crisis, and there is nothing new or unique about 
the practice. In that sense the banking crisis needs to be seen in a wider context. It is just part of 
an approach to law that has been pervasive in business over a long period of time and in a range 
of contexts, and there have been warnings enough of the dangers inherent in it, notably via 
Enron.15  
 
Problems created by securitisation of subprime assets have constituted one of the key triggers of 
the banking crisis. Securitisation is a form of off-balance sheet financing (OBSF), and both 
OBSF in general and securitisation in particular can be seen as prime examples of a longstanding 
                                                
12 Research interviews 2004 
13 Research interviews 2004 
14 Research interviews 2004 
15 D McBarnet ‘After Enron: will whiter than white collar crime still wash?’ (2006) 46 British Journal of 
Criminology; Bethany McLean ‘Enron was the pit canary but its death went unheeded’, Guardian, 4 October 2008 
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practice of legal engineering to deal with ‘obstructive’ laws. Though both securitisation and 
OBSF in general have been defended as, properly used, of real value to business and society, 
they have also been systematically and pervasively exploited over a long period of years as a 
deliberate means of undermining attempts at regulatory control.  
 
OBSF, particularly through the use of the ‘special purpose entities’ (SPEs) or ‘vehicles’ (SPVs) 
that feature so centrally in securitisation – separate companies or other legal forms that have 
been carefully constructed to be technically legally distinct from the originating company -  has a 
long history. It has been widely used in corporate creative accounting as a technique for 
consciously circumventing company law obligations to disclose a ‘true and fair view’ of 
corporate finances to shareholders. It has been used to keep debts or liabilities out of the 
accounts, enhancing apparent performance and misleading the market. Since accounts are used 
as the basis of all sorts of further specific corporate governance controls, OBSF has also been 
used to circumvent them.  Bank loan covenants might stipulate tolerance of only a certain level 
of debt to equity before a loan can be called in. Keeping debt off the books – even if it might 
ultimately come back to haunt the company in the future – removes this control. It has also 
meant the negation of shareholders’ rights, often written into the company’s memorandum and 
articles of association, to call an EGM if a particular debt/equity ratio is exceeded. Performance 
related pay and bonuses have also been magnified by profits and growth reported in the books, 
even if they had no fundamental economic substance.16  
 
Banks have played a key role not only in engineering their own OBS practices but in creating 
and very actively marketing schemes to corporate clients to relieve the client’s books of 
liabilities and losses with all the advantages just noted. Many corporate interviewees in my 
research emphasised the active role of investment banks in corporate OBSF schemes, sometimes 
indeed, in hindsight in more recent interviews, with some vituperation. One major bank’s head of 
compliance complained about: 
 
the snake oil salesmen from the investment banks coming in and saying “Everyone’s 
doing this, why aren’t you?” putting enormous pressure on young directors. 17  
 
Banks were also active participants both in corporate-initiated schemes and in the schemes they 
were purveying themselves. They would, for example, play the crucial role of independent third 
party in the structuring of an SPV, this being a key element in meeting the criteria that would let 
the SPV be treated as a legal entity separate from the originating company. Or they might 
temporarily buy liabilities to get them off the client’s balance sheet at a legally significant 
moment.  
 
Banks could indeed be in the interesting situation where one department of the bank was actively 
marketing a device to take debts off a client’s balance sheet, so undermining the covenants of the 
bank loans lent by another department of the same bank. It might be worth noting here the wider 
implications of the banks’ role in general corporate off-balance sheet financing. It was not just 
bank risk which was disguised but general corporate indebtedness and therefore corporate 
                                                
16 D McBarnet and C Whelan, Creative Accounting and the Cross-eyed Javelin Thrower (Chichester, John Wiley, 
1999) 
17 Research interviews 2007 
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vulnerability in the face of the kind of credit crunch the banking crisis has produced.  Banks’ 
OBSF activities have played a part in the economic and not just the financial crisis.  
 
Banks were also heavily implicated in Enron’s OBSF practices, a fact that led to some interesting 
developments in the deferred prosecutions that followed, of which more later.  
Enron famously, or infamously, used a host of SPEs, derivatives and other creative legal devices 
to hide liabilities and boost apparent profits, while at the same time constructing a vast range of 
tax avoidance devices to the point where it received tax rebates.18 Enron executives, of course, 
also resorted to, and were prosecuted for, fraud, but the reality is that the corporation was doing a 
pretty good job of misleading the market even without resort to fraud. Indeed comments at 
Congressional investigations repeatedly drove this point home.19 Many of the devices used by 
Enron were standard business practice. Indeed at the 2002 annual meeting of the US Bond 
Market Association one member is reported as asking: ‘How do we help the market distinguish 
between what we do and what Enron did?’ The question was put to speaker Harvey Pitt, then 
chair of the SEC, and the report notes ‘he had no ready answer.’20 Enron’s use of legal 
engineering to circumvent regulatory control was far from unique. 
 
A single device of legal engineering can often circumvent multiple regulatory obstacles. SPEs 
have been used to circumvent all manner of other laws and regulations such as tax, disclosure 
rules in takeovers and trade embargoes. Synthetic securitisation, described in interview as ‘the 
transfer of economic or credit risk associated with assets without transferring the assets’, was 
credited by the interviewee as being: 
 
helpful in the face of anti-assignment clauses, transfer restrictions under the laws or 
jurisdictions where the assets are located, securities law registration issues regarding 
transfers of assets or securities, legal investment restrictions, withholding tax and stamp 
duty,21  
 
a useful tool indeed.  
 
And of course both synthetic securitisation and securitisation in general, along with derivatives 
and other innovative legal structuring, gave banks an escape route from the constraints of capital 
adequacy regulation, an escape route that was precisely the purpose of the innovation.  
 
Creative legal responses to regulation 
 
Regulation and regulators have been criticised strongly in the wake of the banking crisis, and 
with justification, but it is also important to remember that whatever regulation is put in place, 
business, in this case banks, will routinely respond by seeking out ways to circumvent it. 
                                                
18 D McBarnet ‘After Enron: will whiter than white collar crime still wash?’ (2006) 46 British Journal of 
Criminology 
19 ‘The real scandal here may be from not what is illegal, but what is totally permissible. If the GAAP allow the 
bookkeeping shenanigans that have been reported in the press then we should all go into the derivative business. It 
seems that all too often the name of the corporate game is to conceal the true financial situation of the company 
while doing the minimum amount of disclosure to avoid legal exposure.’ (US Senate 2002, Senator Thompson). 
20 Andrew Osterland, ‘Commercial Paper Chase’ (2002), CFO Magazine, 1 June 
21 Research interviews 2004 
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Reviewing the history of off-balance sheet practices in banking, a 2003 report by one 
international bank noted:  
 
 The motivation [for OBSF] was heightened in the late 1980s by the introduction of risk-
based capital guidelines for banks and thrifts.22  
 
In this the banks were behaving no differently from any other big business. Introduce a new 
regulatory strategy and the business response will be a new circumvention strategy.  Require 
companies to consolidate subsidiaries and the response is creative structures to constitute ‘non-
subsidiary subsidiaries’ or SPVs that fall beyond the definition of subsidiaries. Capture in the tax 
net the practice of ‘bed and breakfasting’ shares to artificially crystallise tax losses and the 
response is share-‘weekending’ to tweak the technique using parallel but technically different 
criteria. Count the loans on the books as part of a regulatory risk assessment and the response is 
to come up with some creative legal engineering to get those loans off the books.  
 
The first Basel concordat on banking regulation, in 1988, prompted a flurry of creativity to 
circumvent its constraints and indeed use it as an opportunity to secure competitive advantage 
through that circumvention. Legal engineering involves close scrutiny of the wording of laws 
and regulations in order to work out how to package a transaction in such a way that it can claim 
to meet the technical demands of the regulation even if the result is not what the creators of that 
regulation had in mind. Definitions and criteria involving clear rules or thresholds make 
particularly valuable material for legal engineers to work on. The criteria set out in Basel I were 
scrutinised in just this way and the distinction between tier 1 and tier 2 capital provided, said the 
FT , ‘a rich vein of material with which financial engineers have worked’23 – with, it should be 
noted, legal engineering integral to the process.  
 
Tier 1 capital was the safest capital with higher weighting, equity being the prime example since 
it did not have to be repaid in the event of crisis. The challenge therefore became how to invent 
an instrument which could claim to meet the tier I criteria while still attracting investors by 
offering them the kind of investor security that, for example, a bond would give. It had in short 
to do the magic trick of apparently involving no risk to either bank or investor.  
 
One early response (1989) was the construction of preference shares with dividends which could 
be interrupted if the bank got into trouble. They were also, in legal form, ‘permanent’, meaning 
that in theory they need never be repaid, all of this enabling them to be claimed as tier 1 capital, 
although in practice they were structured such that they could be redeemed after five years. The 
attraction of this instrument was that it raised money that, it was claimed, had the same tier 1 
status as equity, while avoiding the rights issue that equity raising would involve and, since it 
was done through an SPV, also avoiding the need to seek the approval of shareholders.24 Reports 
on this instrument noted that the banking supervisors intended to keep a close eye on innovative 
instruments to prevent the Basel agreement being subverted. There were similar concerns with 
RBS’s early innovative floating rate notes (also 1989). The Bank of England prevaricated on 
whether to accept the bank’s claim that they qualified as upper tier 2 capital, allowing the first 
                                                
22 Nomura Fixed Income Research Off-balance sheet update (11 March 2003) 2 
23 Financial Times 6 December 1990 
24 Barclays, reported in the Financial Times, 9 May 1989  
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issue, only to disallow further issues when the Basel Committee made it clear it saw the 
instrument as a threat to the regime: it ‘would open the door to a variety of innovations that 
might ultimately undermine the Basel Agreement’.25  From the beginning, in short, there were 
creative challenges for the regulators which only became more sophisticated over time in 
response to both competition and changing regulations. 
 
In legal engineering any new regulation is seen simply as a new challenge to be overcome. 
OBSF regulation was significant for the banking industry both in relation to banks’ own 
securitisation practices and, as we have seen, in relation to the lucrative services they were 
marketing to clients. So, when the US Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) introduced 
new rulings on off-balance sheet financing after Enron,26 the banks’ response was not to 
capitulate and accept more activities would now go on the balance sheet, but, as one international 
bank noted in an analysis of current trends, to search for ‘practical solutions to avoid 
consolidation.’27   
 
In the same 2003 document the bank analysed the new regulations to explore possible ways to 
avoid the consolidation they required. It suggested restructuring collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) and ABCP programmes to fall within an exclusion in the rules, which did ‘not apply to a 
“qualifying special purpose entity” or QSPE under FAS 140(14c)’. This approach was 
predictable, exploitation of exclusions and exemptions being a standard technique of legal 
engineering. Concern was expressed however that this would constrain the ability to actively 
market the asset portfolios backing the deals. Another route, the bank’s researchers suggested, 
looking closely at the wording of the regulation, would be: 
 
to disperse a VIE’s [Variable Interest Entity] economic risks and benefits among many 
parties, so that none holds a majority of variable interests requiring consolidation  
 
though there would be problems with this: 
 
if third party holders of variable interests insist on having a measure of control 
proportionate to their economic stake.  
 
The ideal way would be another route, finding an:  
 
aggressive (but not manifestly unreasonable) basis for measuring variable interests in a 
way which does not closely correspond to their economic risks and benefits 
…[then]…dispersing variable interests without dispersing the economic risks and 
benefits. 
 
Such a device, the document noted, would be the ‘holy grail’ to search for. This is just one 
example of how every new regulation becomes a challenge to be creatively overcome, and to be 
scrutinised for escape routes, usually with some success. Certainly Accountancy Age in 2008 
                                                
25 Independent, 1 June 1989  
26 FIN 46, FASB Interpretation No 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities, an Interpretation of ARB No 51 
(17 January 2003)  
27 Nomura Fixed Income Research Off-balance sheet update (11 March 2003) 1 
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reported a general loss of confidence within the FASB on how to tackle off-balance sheet 
financing: though new rules were introduced in the US after Enron, ‘the banks found a way 
round these.’28  
 
Over time regulatory initiatives to control or ensure the disclosure of risk have spawned a range 
of new and ever more complex securitisations which let banks expand their lending without 
having to increase their risk capital. This has of course been argued to have real value: 
 
Structured finance allows people to raise money they might not otherwise be able to 
raise, and that access to capital contributes to productivity.29  
 
And where risk really has moved from the banks, the argument goes, then it is right to treat 
innovative forms as substantively and not just technically compliant. One question that arises 
from the current crisis, however, is how far were the risks truly removed? There is also the issue 
of how adequately they were disclosed. In addition, the apparently infinite capacity to lend off-
balance sheet without the need for balancing capital encouraged much riskier lending than could 
otherwise have been undertaken. Indeed, the legal capacity to securitise itself stimulated a 
hunger for opportunities to create loans or other assets that could be securitised.30 Rather than 
securitisation being built on pre-existing assets with their own economic logic, the possibility of 
securitisation prompted the creation of assets – such as subprime loans – to securitise, regardless 
of their intrinsic economic logic. Small wonder there was concomitant expansion of systemic 
risk.  
 
Economic risk issues are beyond the scope of this paper, as is the adequacy of the regulations 
themselves. The focus of this paper is the strategic approach taken to law and regulation by the 
regulated, and the point there is that regulatory attempts to control bank risk were - as is routine 
and pervasive practice in any big business context - consciously and deliberately met by attempts 
to innovate out of them, and that innovation involved not just mathematical or financial 
creativity but legal creativity. For banks, capital adequacy regulations, designed to control risk, 
were ‘obstructions’ to be ‘dealt with’ through creative legal engineering. 
 
The role of tax in structured finance 
 
This legal engineering was right at the core of structured finance. Legal engineering is what 
translated the financial whizz-kid’s idea into a legally and therefore economically viable product:  
 
the potential of the product depends on the ratio of cost it would incur to get round legal, 
regulatory, tax or accounting difficulties31   
 
The reference to tax is pertinent. Creative tax avoidance was a frequent driver of securitisation as 
well as a key element in profit and indeed in marketability. There was always a basic issue in any 
                                                
28 Penny Sukhraj ‘FASB probes off-balance sheet rules’, Accountancy Age 29 February 2008 
29 Lynn Turner, former chief accountant at the SEC and professor of accounting at Colorado State University, 
quoted in CFO magazine, October 2002, www.cfo.com 
30 An example of insurance products being created in order to securitise them is given in the next section. 
31 Research interviews 2004 
  9 
legal engineering of ensuring that devices intended to circumvent one set of regulations, such as 
capital adequacy rules, did not end up with adverse tax repercussions, and an equally basic 
practice of working to retain both tax and regulatory advantages even where logically the 
securing of one advantage should have been at the expense of the other.  
 
Legal engineering is about having your cake and eating it too. Hybrid capital, for example, was 
designed to achieve both the capital adequacy advantages of equity and the tax advantages of 
debt. In normal usage equity would be best for the capital adequacy count but equity does not 
generate the tax allowable costs of debt which boost the return on equity. ‘Hybrid capital’ was 
conjured up to claim qualification as Tier 1 capital under the Basel framework while still being 
tax deductible. It is, as noted by a UK regulator: 
 
capital that acts like debt as far as the taxman is concerned, and capital that acts like 
equity as far as the depositor is concerned…Market participants have been quite 
imaginative in devising structures that meet diverse requirements in different jurisdictions 
to qualify as debt for tax purposes and equity for accounting purposes.32  
 
This indeed is parallel to the convertible bonds created in the corporate sector in the 1980s to 
simultaneously meet the apparently contradictory criteria of both debt and equity for different 
regulatory purposes.  
 
Tax avoidance can itself be a primary driver of structured finance, and the source of the profit 
generated. In its 2009 ‘Tax Gap’ series, the Guardian reported structured finance deals, such as 
those where: 
 
  “investments” of £6 billion at a time…moved in circles between RBS and other 
banks’… [as] … an important factor in driving the “securitisation” boom which led to 
worldwide financial calamity.33  
 
Creatively structuring in tax avoidance can also be key to the marketability of the underlying 
assets for securitisation – and it is important to remember here that assets have sometimes been 
created in order to securitise them rather than the securitisation following from the pre-existence 
of the assets. A securitisable insurance product for example, might be dreamed up in the abstract, 
and successfully legally engineered. But then the insurance policies had to be sold - to give the 
product ‘an insurance wrap’34 – and constitute the underlying asset. In marketing the policies the 
lure of tax avoidance for the purchasers proved key:  
 
The objective is the securitisation but we use the legal benefits to get the policies sold. 
It’s sold as a cheap way for high net worth individuals to leave money to heirs, avoiding 
IHT [inheritance tax].35 
 
                                                
32 Thomas Huertas, Director, Banking Sector, FSA (2008) ‘Hybrid Capital’, speech at City and Financial Bank 
Capital Seminar, 26 June 
33 Guardian, 13 March 2009  
34 Research interviews 2004 
35 Research interviews 2004 
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In a number of ways, then, the legal engineering of tax avoidance has also been a key driver of, 
and integral to the profit in, banks’ securitisation and other structured finance transactions, and 
this has added further layers of complexity to transaction structures.  
 
Legal engineering and the production of complexity 
 
In highly structured transactions of any kind – and these instruments were, as one lawyer put it, 
‘hellishly structured’36 – there is typically complexity and opacity. So if the securitisation 
transactions behind the banking crisis were retrospectively deemed too complex and opaque for 
their risk to be comprehended,37 it is hardly surprising. But a key factor in why highly structured 
finance became highly structured was the desire to circumvent regulation.  
 
Dealing with regulatory obstacles involves complex and sophisticated legal work in long chains 
of transaction structures, and this is neither accidental nor incidental but inherent in the task of 
regulatory circumvention. A solution to one regulatory problem will inevitably throw up new 
legal, regulatory, accounting and tax problems, which in turn need to be dealt with. Solving them 
will involve the addition to the transaction structure of further complex steps or partners or legal 
entities or jurisdictions and the final product may indeed be a ‘labyrinthine’ structure that is hard 
to comprehend. But if financial instruments are too complex to understand, it is important to 
recognise that one of the reasons for that complexity is the legal engineering that lies behind 
them and the multiplicity of laws, regulations, taxes and jurisdictions that are being 
circumvented in order to avoid regulatory control.  
 
The complexity, incomprehensibility and opacity of risk attributed to innovative financial 
instruments can then be characterised not simply as an unfortunate by-product of financial 
engineering but as an integral part of legal engineering. And whether or not there was awareness 
of the financial risk being created, there was most certainly a very clear awareness that the 
regulations intended to control and disclose financial risk were being systematically 
circumvented by legal engineering. That indeed was its purpose. In fact my research over the 
years underlined to me that the risks that primarily concerned legal engineers, whether in the 
corporate or the banking sectors, were not financial risks at all but ‘structural risks’38 – the risk 
that the regulatory and tax circumvention integral to the transactions might be challenged by the 
authorities. 
 
 
 
 
Redefining the problem, redefining the solution 
 
                                                
36 Research interviews 2004 
37  Remember the quote footnoted in the introduction to this paper from John McFall, chairman, House of Commons 
Treasury Committee: ‘Product complexity has introduced increased opacity into our financial system, making it it 
almost impossible to determine where risk lies and making it much more difficult to achieve financial stability’ 
quoted by Alan McDermid, ‘Banks “refused to believe the good times were about to end”’, The Herald, 3 March 
2008 
38 Research interviews 2004 
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Reconceptualising financial innovation as legal innovation gives a different take on some of the 
problems underlying the banking crisis and raises different issues that need to be addressed. I’ll 
consider the implications of this analysis for four issues:  
• changing the regulations 
• principles-based regulation  
• the allocation of responsibility 
• the relevance of current events, movements and mood.  
 
Changing the Regulations  
 
Regulations and regulators have themselves come under fire as a result of the current financial 
crisis. Capital adequacy regulations have been described as inadequate and promises made that 
they will become more demanding.39 But as we have seen in the course of this paper, any new 
regulation tends to be met with the same energetic drive to circumvent it, and there should be no 
expectation of a quick fix from increasing the capital adequacy ratios required or prohibiting 
specific instruments currently in use.  
 
Legal engineering is all about getting round the rules, whatever shape they currently take. We 
saw instances of that earlier in this paper in our discussion of the banks’ response to the 
introduction of new regulations on off-balance sheet financing. New regulations can simply 
stimulate new devices to escape them. Financial innovation has been discussed as ‘bricolage’,40 
with ‘bricoleurs’ using ‘whatever is at hand’ to construct new products from the current finite 
materials around them. One of those materials is law. Legal engineers use whatever law is 
available at any given moment, sometimes drawing from areas of law and regulation not hitherto 
seen as relevant to the context in hand, in order to construct new ways out of control. Law is both 
the obstacle to be overcome, and the ‘raw material to be worked on’41 in order to achieve that.  
However regulations are changed, they will be complied with ‘creatively’ and there needs to be 
awareness that the same could happen in the current context with new regulations unless the 
whole approach to compliance is addressed.  
  
That is not to say that regulations should not be enhanced, that creative compliance cannot be 
made a little more difficult, that legal engineers should not be challenged by presenting them 
with tougher obstacles to surmount. And the pleas of ignorance at the top could be addressed. On 
this, lessons might be learned from the post-Enron deferred prosecutions in the US.  
 
Several banks which had been involved in Enron’s schemes, along with KPMG, were not 
immediately prosecuted for their roles, but were monitored under deferred prosecution 
                                                
39 Eg Callum McCarthy, chairman FSA, ‘Lessons from the financial crisis’, speech at Manchester Business School, 
13 May 2008, 3, and Mansion House Speech, 18 Sep 2008 
40 E Engelen, I Erturk, J Froud, A Leaver, K Williams, ‘Reconceptualising Financial Innovation: frame, conjecture 
and bricolage’, Conference on the Future of Financial Regulation, Glasgow University, 29-30 March 2009; D 
MacKenzie, ‘An equation and its worlds: bricolage, exemplars, disunity and performativity in financial economics’, 
Social Studies of Science, vol 33, no 6, pp 831-68 
41 Doreen McBarnet, ‘Law and capital: the role of legal form and legal actors’ in McBarnet (ed.)  Law and Capital,  
Special Issue of International Journal of the Sociology of Law,  Academic Press,  1984, reprinted in McBarnet 
Crime, compliance and control, op cit  
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agreements. Prosecution was deferred so long the firms undertook a range of obligations, with 
the threat of prosecution dropped after a specified time. These agreements included some 
obligations of direct relevance to the kind of legal engineering discussed in this paper.42 Firms 
were, for example, required to set up committees of senior executives  (‘Head of Group or 
experienced designee’) from all the ‘disciplines’ in the firm, to review and approve transactions, 
with the need for agreement of all Heads before a transaction structure was approved. This 
review obligation extended, to cite the Merrill Lynch agreement, to ‘all complex structured 
finance transactions effected by a third party with Merrill Lynch.’43 This requirement for the 
direct involvement of top management is in line with the FSA’s call for responsibility at the top 
of organisations, it is best practice in some organisations,44 and it might be a mechanism that 
should be given greater emphasis, especially in the wake of senior bankers’ protests that they 
simply didn’t realise what was going on or the risk it involved.  
 
Under the deferred prosecution agreements these committees were required not just to ensure 
that the transactions did not technically break the law. They also had to consider their wider 
effects. The agreements prohibited firms from engaging in any transaction intended to ‘achieve a 
misleading earnings, revenue or balance sheet effect’45 for the corporation involved. Note the 
reference to ‘misleading’ rather than just ‘fraudulent’ effects. There was also a demand that in 
assessing these structures, there should be a shift of focus from technical compliance to a 
concern with the ‘objectives’ of the structuring, with a purely accounting or tax objective 
deemed inappropriate. 
 
Given the impact of Enron at the time it is not surprising that the focus in these agreements was 
on the bank’s role in facilitating OBSF deals for other corporations. Hence the concern with third 
party transactions and with the effects on the third party’s accounts. But there is no reason why 
the same standards could not be set for monitoring a bank’s own transactions and the effect on its 
own balance sheet. The underlying concept was that it was not enough for a transaction to be, 
under a strict or literal reading of the law or regulation, technically not illegal. There needed to 
be some responsibility taken too for its wider purpose and effects. This reflected public concern 
at the time not just over Enron’s fraud but over the whole idea of legally engineered structures 
that could claim to be ‘perfectly legal’, or ‘not illegal’, but nonetheless defeated regulatory 
policy. The same public concern is clear now in relation to banking practice itself.  
 
Principles-based regulation 
 
As a result of the banking crisis, principles-based regulation – the flagship approach of the FSA 
– has come in for severe criticism. Julia Black has described the approach as having suffered ‘a 
potentially fatal blow’.46 Indeed FSA officials themselves have declared principles-based 
regulation a failure in that ‘a principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have 
                                                
42 See for a detailed analysis, D McBarnet ‘After Enron: will whiter than white collar crime still wash?’ (2006) 
British Journal of Criminology 46, issue 6  
43US Department of Justice ‘Enron Task Force Agreement with Merrill Lynch on Deferred Prosecution’ (2003) 
44 Research interviews 2007 
45 US Department of Justice ‘Enron Task Force Agreement with Merrill Lynch on Deferred Prosecution’ (2003) 
46 Julia Black, ‘The death of credit, trust – and principles-based regulation?’ (December 2008) Risk and Regulation, 
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no principles’.47 But critics seem to be equating principles with soft touch regulation and the two 
do not necessarily have to coincide.   
 
There are different philosophies and strategies behind principles-based regulation. Sometimes 
the approach is to provide a broad goal in order to allow for variations in detail or 
implementation. This approach characterises regimes bent on harmonisation of different bodies 
of regulation, and is often a way of achieving broad harmonisation – or the appearance of 
harmonisation - without every party having to agree on every detail. It can be a product of 
political expediency, or of an approach which finds it more appropriate to delegate detail to a 
lower regulatory rung. The FSA’s approach – and it was also bringing into one regime a range of 
different organisations with different regulations - was to set very broad behavioural standards 
but allow for variation in the methods used to achieve those standards, allowing a broad sweep of 
laissez-faire so long  as the ‘outcomes’ met the goals. This exhibited a great deal of trust in the 
regulated and their ability to self-regulate, and it tied closely with the dominance of market 
ideology.  
 
There can be another philosophy behind principles-based regulation however, where it is driven 
not so much by trust in the regulated and their capacity for restraint, but by distrust, based on 
experience, and by the need for constraint. Driving this approach is an explicit recognition that 
any specific rule will be met by legal engineering to circumvent it, and principles-based 
regulation is seen as the only realistic response, the only way to try to capture the spirit of the 
law in the face of constant creativity and technical challenge. This approach featured to some 
extent in the FSA’s adoption of principles-based regulation but it was the overwhelming driving 
force behind the adoption of this style of regulation in the 1990s by the Accounting Standard 
Board (ASB). For the ASB principles-based regulation was an essential bastion against 
opportunistic legal engineering. 
  
It would be unwise in the extreme for the FSA to abandon the idea of principles-based regulation 
because of the current debacle. A reversion to rules will simply result in legal engineers 
developing ways out of them with bright line rules to point to in their defence. Creative 
compliance thrives on rule based regulation, for tight specific rules provide particularly solid 
material for legal engineers to work with.  
 
Importantly, though, principles will certainly not stop legal engineering if they are not strongly 
enforced. The ASB emphasised the need for principles to control creative compliance with law 
and regulation through legal and accounting engineering. However the body responsible for 
enforcing accounting standards, the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) was not noted for 
its use of principles in its enforcement practices, tending instead to monitor for and enforce 
compliance with specific rules. ASB chairman David Tweedie frequently stated that the 
requirement in company law to give a true and fair view in accounts should override even 
compliance with specific rules if such compliance did not result in a true and fair view of the 
financial situation. However, research48 on the FRRP’s enforcement practice showed that it did 
not use the ‘true and fair’ requirement in this way. The Panel quite frequently refused to accept 
situations where a company had invoked the override as a reason for not following specific rules. 
                                                
47 Hector Sants, chief executive FSA, speech at Thomson Reuters, 12 March 2009, Guardian, 13 March 20009 
48 D McBarnet and C Whelan Creative Accounting and the Cross-eyed Javelin Thrower, John Wiley, 1999 
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But there were no instances of the Panel doing the opposite, that is, itself using the override to 
reject a company’s technical compliance if it was not deemed to result in a true and fair view of 
the accounts, though it was for this situation that Tweedie had particularly advocated its use.  
 
The FSA has used principles as a means of enforcement in cases where there were deemed to be 
unacceptable effects even though there was arguably no breach of a specific rule. In one case 
there was no specific rule to deal with the situation. In the other the infringement took place 
outside FSA jurisdiction.49 Using principles in this way helps tackle the kind of legal engineering 
which takes advantage of an absence of rules, and innovates into a vacuum. But it would take 
more to challenge legal engineering based on a claim to technical compliance with extant rules, 
despite the fact that the net result is not what was intended. For that approach to be challenged, 
principles need to be brought in not just to fill a vacuum in the book of specific rules but to 
override the rulebook if the principles have not also been met. That is the only way to ensure 
technical compliance with the letter of the law is subjugated to a requirement to comply with its 
spirit. And to be meaningful this would have to be the basis not just of regulatory rhetoric but of 
regulatory enforcement. 
 
However too much can be expected of principles-based regulation. It is difficult to enforce 
principles. There is not always consent on whether a practice constitutes compliance with the 
spirit of the law.50 Some financial products seem to have left regulators stumped as to whether or 
not they are legitimate. Thomas Huertas, Director of the Banking Sector of the FSA, discussing 
hybrid capital, pondered on whether it was ‘admirable alchemy or invidious innovation.’51 There 
is a real reluctance to use principles in enforcement because of the criticisms of subjectivity, 
retrospectivity and too much power being usurped by regulators, and even principles and broad 
abstract concepts take the form of words which can still provide material for legal engineers to 
work on.52  
 
Principles should not be abandoned, but neither are they the panacea. Indeed underlying the issue 
of principles or rules is a more fundamental problem: the culture that fosters legal engineering 
and its presumption of legitimacy.  
 
Legal engineering and Responsibility 
 
The rule of law may be seen as a fundamental of democratic society, but that is not how it is 
approached in the practice of legal engineering. In the mindset of the legal engineer, law or 
regulation is not a legitimate and authoritative command to be taken at face value, respected and 
obeyed. It is simply a nuisance, an obstacle to be overcome, a material to be worked with and 
reshaped to one’s advantage, a challenge in a regulatory cat and mouse game.  
 
                                                
49 Citigroup and Deutsche Bank, 2006. In the case of Citigroup there is no suggestion that a specific rule was 
infringed. In the case of Deutsche Bank the infringements occurred in foreign markets not regulated by the FSA, so 
that the FSA’s specific rules did not apply. Enforcement took place by invoking FSA principles. 
50 Though it is sometimes forgotten that can be equally true of specific rules. 
51 Thomas Huertas Director, Banking Sector, FSA (2008) ‘Hybrid Capital’, speech at City and Financial Bank 
Capital Seminar, 26 June 
52 ‘When compliance is not the solution but the problem: from changes in law to changes in attitude’, in V 
Braithwaite (ed) Taxing Democracy, Ashgate, 2003, reprinted in McBarnet, Crime,compliance and control, op cit 
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Legal engineers know they are not following the intentions or spirit of the law. Bankers and 
banking lawyers talk in interview about their legal practices as ‘bullish’ or ‘sailing close to the 
wind’. Indeed they are sometimes surprised when they succeed, when regulators fail to see 
through what a lawyer described as the ‘fog’ of complexity and opacity, a fog which indeed can 
be developed for just that purpose. In the mindset that underlies and fosters legal engineering, all 
the responsibility for control is being placed on the regulators. If they can’t make regulations 
legal-engineering proof or spot the failings in the schemes it is fair game to exploit that situation. 
Ideas such as responsibility, the public good, morality, ethics or integrity do not enter into the 
equation. All, it seems, is fair in love and law. 
 
But should all the responsibility for securing compliance rest with writers and enforcers of 
regulation? Or should the regulated too not be seen as having a responsibility to comply with the 
spirit of the law? Black describes the regulations on capital adequacy as too easy to get round.53 
But that takes as given the culture of circumvention. The present crisis may indicate it is time to 
question that culture and its legitimacy and to place more responsibility for the efficacy of 
regulation on the regulated.  
 
What this paper has reminded us of too is the behind-the-scenes but active and crucial role of the 
legal profession in creative compliance. At the core of financial engineering is legal engineering 
which depends heavily on lawyers and legal work. Professional responsibility therefore also 
needs to be questioned and the meaning of professional ethics in relation to the rule of law 
addressed.  
 
If the legitimacy of legal engineering and creative compliance is to be reassessed, politicians also 
need to put their own house in order since they have been as guilty of legal engineering, creative 
compliance and disrespect for the law as banks and corporations have. Politicians and 
governments have themselves thoroughly exploited this ‘bullish’, technical and literal approach 
to law, not just in such practices as the careful technical packaging of party donations as loans in 
the ‘peerages for loans’ scandal, but also in core financial policy. UK Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown has said he wants: 
 
all companies to bring out their bad assets and put them back on their balance sheet so the 
financial system can move forward.54 
 
Yet for years the government itself used off-balance sheet financing techniques in the form of the 
Private Finance Initiative to enhance public accounts. There is more than a whiff of hypocrisy in 
politicians denouncing such activities as tax avoidance and off-balance sheet financing while 
themselves using the letter of the law to defeat its spirit. If a more responsible approach to the 
rule of law is to be encouraged there must be more of what corporate responsibility consultants 
and regulators have referred to as ‘tone at the top’.55 
                                                
53 Julia Black, ‘The death of credit, trust – and principles-based regulation?’ (December 2008) Risk and Regulation, 
8 
54 Institute of Financial Accountants  website,‘Gordon Brown has vowed to force banks and other businesses to put 
their off-balance sheet liabilities into their books’, 25 September 2008, www.ifa.org.uk/news 
55 ‘Tone at the Top: Getting It Right’ (Speech delivered at the Second Annual General Counsel Roundtable, 
Washington DC, 3 December 2004). 
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Carpe diem 
 
There has been a growing regulatory rhetoric, especially since Enron, for a more ethical stance in 
relation to law and compliance and for greater emphasis on compliance with the spirit of the 
law.56 The financial crisis may provide an opportunity – if, and it’s a very big ‘if’, the political 
and professional will is there - to shift from rhetoric to practice. The banking crisis has added 
force to a public discontent with business that began with Enron, a discontent that demonstrates 
growing awareness of, and strong objections to, the practice of technical compliance with the 
letter but not the spirit of the law, and the lack of basic ethics in business and public life. Recent 
UK experience over politicians’ approach to expenses has strengthened this public mood to a 
level of public disgust that could be harnessed to change. Taxpayer funding of banks could also 
provide an opportunity for setting new standards of social and legal responsibility in the banking 
sector itself.  
 
There are also other trends and forces at work that might be harnessed. The corporate social 
responsibility movement has been expanding its agenda beyond pressures for environmental 
responsibility and human rights to concerns with a more ethical approach in business to finance 
and to legal compliance. This has been expressed particularly in the context of tax avoidance but 
has the potential to be harnessed too to a wider critique of cavalier approaches to law – by 
business, professions or politicians – and to a call for compliance with the spirit of the law.57 The 
banking crisis has demonstrated that clever manipulation of law and circumvention of regulation 
may not be quite so clever after all, and that its social costs can be devastating. There is a 
growing awareness of the unfairness by which those with the resources to do so can buy their 
way out of legal control at the expense of those who cannot.  
 
The time may be appropriate for a new aspiration towards a greater respect for the rule of law, a 
greater respect for democracy in law, and a new legal integrity. Certainly it will require a shift as 
fundamental as that, and not just some tinkering with the rules, for there ever to be any hope of 
effectively regulating banking or indeed business in general. 
 
 
 
                                                
56 D McBarnet, ‘Compliance, ethics and responsibility: emergent governance strategies in the US and UK’  in J 
O’Brien (ed) Private equity, corporate governance and the Dynamics of Capital Market Governance (London, 
Imperial College Press, 2007) 
57  For a detailed analysis see Doreen McBarnet ‘Corporate Social Responsibility beyond law, through law, for law: 
the new corporate accountability’ in McBarnet D, A Voiculescu, T Campbell (eds) The new corporate 
Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, hardback 
2007, paperback 2009) 
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